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Abstract
This dissertation studies the quadratic relationship between the debt-to-GDP ratio
and GDP growth rate, and attempts to find threshold levels past which an increase
in debt harms growth. Observing 12 European countries from 1993 to 2017, evi-
dence was found supporting the existence of thresholds around the 110% debt-to-
GDP ratio. These thresholds are considerably higher than those found in previous
research. The growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio was also analyzed and found




The recent European sovereign debt crisis brought government debt to the fore-
front of economic and political discussion. The large hike in both debt interest
rates and government debt that affected some European countries forced many,
economists or otherwise, to consider the impact that those new debt levels would
have on the economy. The constraint placed on policy through the imposition of
limits on government debt by the euro convergence criteria (also known as the
Maastricht criteria) further reinforced the need for this reflection.
While public debt seems to have a positive influence on the growth rate
at a low debt-to-GDP ratio, the relationship reverses at higher levels. A non-linear
analysis should therefore be able to produce threshold levels for the debt-to-GDP
ratio at which the positive influence of government debt on growth is maximized.
The inclusion of data from the crisis years in this analysis allows us to observe if
previous results in this area hold during a large shock to some countries’ govern-
ment debt levels, or if evidence is found for new threshold values. As such, this
work uses a methodology largely influenced by Checherita-Westphal & Rother
(2012) to analyze the same 12 countries from 1993 to 2017, and to determine
how the new debt thresholds compare with their results. These countries had
their public finances impacted by the sovereign debt crisis in different ways, pro-
viding a diverse and representative panel.
This dissertation is organized as follows: Section 2 is the literature re-
view; Section 3 presents the methodology and the data; Section 4 provides the
results and their discussion; Section 5 concludes.
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2. Literature Review
Theoretical literature on the effect of public debt on economic growth has his-
torically been more abundant than empirical, but that has started to change. The
long-run growthmodel presented in Diamond (1965) looks at the influence of taxes
on the capital stock when used to finance debt, which is differentiated in both in-
ternal and external debt. The conclusion is that both types of debt decrease the
capital stock due to the need for tax payers to reimburse the debt service. In the
context of a neoclassical growth model, and assuming constant returns to capi-
tal, Saint-Paul (1992) shows that an increase in public debt always reduces the
GDP growth rate. Using an endogenous growth model to study constraints on
tax collection and public debt, Aizenman et al. (2007) find that, while the flow of
public expenditure raises productivity, debt used to finance it always lowers the
growth rate due to the reduction in public goods spending caused by the debt ser-
vice. However, public sector infrastructure spending may not decrease welfare
for infrastructure-poor countries, even if financed through debt. Also using an en-
dogenous growth model, Greiner (2013) finds that, assuming wage rigidity, public
debt cannot influence long-run growth rates. Surveying both theoretical and em-
pirical literature, Panizza & Presbitero (2013) find that evidence for the existence
of thresholds is still ambiguous, but do support Kourtellos et al. (2013) in their
finding that it may be the quality of a country’s institutions that determines how
the debt-to-GDP ratio impacts growth.
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Empirical studies on this matter have differed in time span, number and
type of countries, and methodology. Works that observe a very large group of
countries, such as Schclarek (2004) and Afonso & Jalles (2013), find that growth
rates in OECD and emerging countries relate differently to public debt. Due to
this difference, other studies tend to focus on euro area or select OECD coun-
tries. Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012) observe 12 euro area countries from
1970 to 2008 and find evidence of debt turning points around a 90%-100% debt-
to-GDP ratio, with confidence intervals warning that a negative effect could be
experienced at a ratio as low as 70%. Baum et al. (2013) analyse the same 12
euro area countries for a fraction of that time span, 1990 to 2010, and find thresh-
olds near 72%. However, when the financial crisis years of 2008-2010 are omit-
ted, thresholds lower considerably to about 67% of GDP. In addition, they show
that debt-to-GDP ratios above 70% place upwards pressure on long-term interest
rates. Afonso & Jalles (2014) study 14 European countries between 1970 and
2012, finding an average debt threshold of about 75%. Moreover, they find that
debt service has a much more negative effect on growth than debt itself. Woo
& Kumar (2015) observed a mix of 38 developed and developing countries from
1970 to 2008, and found evidence suggesting that a threshold exists somewhere
around the 90% debt-to-GDP ratio, but did not pinpoint an exact value. When
observing a similar sample of 40 mixed countries from 1965 to 2010, Chudik et al.
(2017) do not find a homogeneous threshold that can be applied to countries in all
stages of development, but do find thresholds of 80% for developed economies,
and around 30-60% for developing economies. Cecchetti et al. (2011) analyze 18
OECD countries from 1980 to 2010 and find a threshold around a 85% ratio of
government debt-to-GDP. They go on to search for thresholds using other types
of debt, such as corporate debt and household debt, with similar results.
The findings obtained by longer term studies in this area are marked by
the observation of data originating from a framework that no longer exists. In the
past 25 years, the European Union has changed dramatically with the establish-
ment of a monetary union and the Stability and Growth Pact – changes that may
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Table 1: Summary Empirical Literature Review
Time Countries Development Average
<=25 Years >25 Years Single 2 to 15 >15 Developed Developing Threshold
Afonso & Jalles (2013) X X X X 59%1
Afonso & Jalles (2014) X X X 75%
Schclarek (2004) X X X X –
Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012) X X X 95%
Baum et al. (2013) X X X X 72%
Spilioti & Vamvoukas (2015) X X X 110%
Woo & Kumar (2015) X X X X 90%1
Chudik et al. (2017) X X X X 80%
Cecchetti et al. (2011) X X X X 85%
Notes: 1 Threshold obtained by sampling both developed and developing countries.
have shifted the nexus between debt and growth for the euro area. However,
newer observations for this region are very much influenced by the European
sovereign debt crisis, which may lead to results that cannot be generalized for
other periods. Thus, it is not clear which time span is to be preferred.
Given the diversity of literature observing euro area countries, some of
these works look at key region-specific frameworks that condition the relationship
between debt and growth. Afonso & Alves (2015) find that the Stability and Growth
Pact had a small but positive effect on growth, while no discernible effect was
found to be attributable to the Maastricht Treaty.
Research focusing on a single country is not as common, but it does
exist. Spilioti & Vamvoukas (2015) perform a time series analysis using 40 years
of Greek data and find evidence supporting the existence of a threshold effect
at the 110% debt-to-GDP ratio. This type of work can explore effects specific to
a single country, such as public infrastructure, which condition the type of public
spending causing an increase in debt. By restricting the observations to a single
country, an even greater control of the changes in the underlying framework is
possible.
It should be mentioned that literature concerning exclusively develop-
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ing countries sometimes focuses on external debt, rather that internal or total
debt. This type of research is much less frequently applied to developed coun-
tries, where foreign debt appears to bear no impact on economic growth1. Ward
et al. (2002) analyze 93 developing countries throughout 29 years and find that,
past a debt-to-GDP ratio of 20%, additional increases in debt show a negative ef-
fect on output. These thresholds are much lower than those found for developed
countries, a result that is in line with other literature, as mentioned earlier.
A short summary of empirical studies can be found in Table 1, which sep-
arates previous research by time span, number, and type of countries sampled. It
also presents an average debt threshold, whenever a comparable model is avail-
able. While this value should by no means be the focus of attention, it provides a
starting point for a quick comparison.
1Ferreira (2014)
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3. Methodology and Data
This work samples a panel of 12 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain) from 1993 to 2017 in order to observe the impact of the debt-to-GDP
ratio in GDP growth, and to calculate threshold points past which an increase in
said ratio leads to a negative effect on growth. It intends to expand the analysis of
Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012) with the crisis period of 2008-2017 in order
to verify whether the extreme conditions of this period confirm the thresholds found
in their work, or if the limits themselves have changed. Beginning the observations
in 1993, rather than 1970, as in the original paper, limits the amount of profound
structural changes that influence our data, such as the Maastricht treaty, which
necessarily impacts results.
Data was obtained from the European Commission’s AMECO database.
A comprehensive description of the data used can be found in appendix A. The
main variables of interest are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 1.
Table 2: Summary description of the main variables.
Variable Obs Mean Min Max
Government Debt 300 74.176 6.941 180.832
GDP Growth 300 1.531 -8.999 24.816
Note: Both variables shown as percentage of GDP. GDP Growth calculated based on real per
capita GDP.
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Figure 1: Government debt as a ratio of GDP for the panel sampled.
The main models used mostly follow the choices of Checherita-Westphal
& Rother (2012), with small changes. Debt is represented as a quadratic equation
in order to calculate threshold levels. Linear models were also estimated and
shown to be much worse fits. Three dependent variables were used – real GDP
per capita annual growth rate, 5 year cumulative real GDP per capita growth rate,
and 5 year cumulative non-overlapping real GDP per capita growth rate.
The basic model follows:
GDPgrowthi,t+k = α + β1debti,t + β2debt
2
i,t + γln(GDP/cap)i,t + δgfcfi,t
+ ϕpopgrowthi,t + othercontrolsi,t + µi + vt + ϵi,t
(1)
Where GDPgrowthi,t+k is the real GDP per capita growth rate for coun-
try i at time t plus k where k = 1 for annual dependent variables and k = 5 if
the dependent variable is a cumulative 5 year growth rate; ln(GDP/cap)i,t is the
logarithm of GDP per capita; debti,t is gross debt as a percentage of GDP, while
debt2i,t is its square value; savings/gfcfi,t is the investment rate as a share of GDP,
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which attempts to proxy gross fixed capital formation; popgrowthi,t is the percent-
age growth rate of the population; othercontrolsi,t are the cyclically adjusted gov-
ernment revenue, the cyclically adjusted budget balance, openness, and the long
term real interest rate; µi are the country fixed effects; vt are the time fixed effects;
and ϵi,t is the error term.
Preliminary testing reveals that GPD growth per capita is non-stationary,
and a Wooldridge test firmly suggests autocorrelation. Due to this, all regressions
were performed using lagged explanatory variables – one period in the case of an-
nual and non-overlapping dependent variables; five periods when the overlapping
growth rate was used as dependent variable. A Hausman test confirms that, for
our models, fixed effects should be used over random effects. These tests can be
found in detail in Appendix B. In order to control for heteroskedasticity, and unob-
servable correlations between explanatory variables and GDP growth rate, stan-
dard errors were clustered on country. This choice does not follow Checherita-
Westphal & Rother (2012), and accounts for larger standard errors, as correcting
for error clustering removes a downward bias on their calculation2. It follows that
the debt threshold confidence intervals calculated should also widen due to this
methodological choice.




Table 3 shows an estimation of the base model and variations using fixed effects.
The dependent variable used is a simple annual growth rate for the first two mod-
els, a cumulative 5 year ”rolling window” overlapping growth rate for the middle
two, and a cumulative 5 year non-overlapping growth rate for the final two. The
explanatory variables are lagged one period for the annual growth rate and the 5
year non-overlapping models, while five periods of lag were used for the 5 year
overlapping models, in order to account for autocorrelation. When compared to
Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012), the coefficients regressed mostly maintain
their signal, size, and statistical significance. The changes are chiefly the loss
of statistical significance for the openness and gross fixed capital formation vari-
ables, and the rise in significance of the long term real interest rate and the savings
variables. In these estimates, no control variable remains statistically significant
across all models.
As expected, we find the debt-to-GDP ratio to have a positive linear effect
on growth, but a negative quadratic term, both highly significant across all mod-
els. This allows the calculation of a debt turning point - a threshold past which
an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio causes a decline in growth. The thresh-
olds obtained with these models, averaging 105%, are similar to those found by
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Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012), but with much wider confidence intervals3.
These broader confidence intervals are likely caused by the clustering of stan-
dard errors, and, possibly, more extreme differences in growth rates and debt
ratios observed during the crisis years. This possibility will be further explored by
restricting the countries sampled.
Table 3: Fixed Effects Models
Annual Growth Rate Cumulative 5 Year Cumulative 5 Year
Overlapping Growth Rate Non-Overlapping Growth Rate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
gov_debt .1248963 ∗∗∗ .1151481 ∗∗∗ .55848 ∗∗∗ .65075 ∗∗ .54595 ∗∗∗ .43644 ∗∗
(.0283954) (.0346088) (.17965) (.22079) (.16929) (.15741 )
gov_debt2 -.0006184 ∗∗∗ -.0006092 ∗∗∗ -.00275 ∗∗∗ -.00257 ∗∗∗ -.00304 ∗∗∗ -.00235 ∗∗
(.0001757) (.0001807) (.0006927) (.0006312) (.0005956) (.0008724)
gov_rev_ca -.0022968 .042245 -.8274248 -.8528041 -.1513821 .9825509
gov_cab .2106793 ∗∗∗ .1852265 ∗∗∗ -.166643 -.7861764 ∗∗∗ 2.160811 ∗∗∗ 1.434566
lgdp_cap -5.460674 -4.549201 -64.20117 ∗∗ -75.90861 ∗∗∗ 22.65 13.72224
pop_g -1.969517 ∗∗ -1.79758 ∗ -2.938267 -4.14432 ∗ -8.474897 ∗∗ -8.313057 ∗∗
pgfcf_total .0961038 – – – – –
gfcf_gov – -.3424112 -1.870243 – .7740059 –
gfcf_priv – .044994 .1011784 – .280357 –
psaving_gov – – – 1.936305 ∗∗ – .6180494
psaving_priv – – – .5624901 ∗ – 1.113293 ∗∗
openness 1.504972 1.548598 7.650795 8.038124 5.728421 9.868241
LT_real_i -.1476701 ∗∗∗ -.1690243 ∗∗∗ .0258798 .2353467 ∗ -.5878332 -.9421007 ∗
N 267 267 219 219 60 60
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12
R2 − within .659321 .6602253 .8309056 .8628612 .8454224 .8652234
Debt Turning Point 100.9907 94.51074 101.71 126.8105 90.00875 115.8877
CI 95% [64.7; 137.3] [64.4; 124.6] [61.4; 142.0] [78.4; 175.2] [55.5; 124.3] [58.1; 127.8]
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marked according to significance level – *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard errors are reported in brackets for the
most relevant variables. The dependent variable is the annual real GDP per capita growth rate for the first two models, a 5 year overlapping
sum of the same variable for the middle models, and a 5 year non-overlapping sum for the final two. A comprehensive description of each
variable can be found in Appendix A. Debt Turning Point, the debt threshold, is calculated as the maximum of an inverse-U shaped parabola,
here given by−gov_debt/2gov_debt2.
3The confidence intervals shown were calculated using the delta method, as implemented
by the nlcom Stata command.
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Table 4: Quadratic and Linear Comparisons for the Fixed Effects Models
Annual Growth Rate Cumulative 5 Year Cumulative 5 Year
Overlapping Growth Rate Non-Overlapping Growth Rate
Model 2 Model 2 (L) Model 3 Model 3 (L) Model 5 Model 5 (L)
gov_debt .1151481 ∗∗∗ .002772 .5584808 ∗∗∗ .0547493 .5459541 ∗∗∗ -.0185661
gov_debt2 -.0006092 ∗∗∗ – -.0027455 ∗∗∗ – -.0030379 ∗∗∗ –
gov_rev_ca .042245 -.0841216 -.8274248 -.8559549 -.1513821 -.6789814
gov_cab .1852265 ∗∗∗ .064196 -.166643 -.5589307 2.160811 ∗∗∗ 1.216989 ∗∗
lgdp_cap -4.549201 -8.247224 ∗∗ -64.20117 ∗∗ -83.78904 ∗∗ 22.65 6.436087
pop_g -1.79758 ∗ -1.949278 ∗ -2.938267 -4.14424 -8.474897 ∗∗ -9.76879 ∗∗
gfcf_gov -.3424112 -.608104 ∗∗ -1.870243 -2.17104 .7740059 .5785746
gfcf_priv .044994 .0997866 .1011784 -.0001479 .280357 .4431192
openness 1.548598 2.491839 7.650795 11.78209 5.728421 9.553172
LT_real_i -.1690243 ∗∗∗ -.3020741 ∗∗∗ .0258798 -.5372598 ∗∗ -.5878332 -1.18571
N 267 267 219 219 60 60
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marked according to significance level – *10%, **5%, ***1%. The dependent variable is the annual
real GDP per capita growth rate for the first two models, a 5 year overlapping sum of the same variable for the middle models, and
a 5 year non-overlapping sum for the final two. A comprehensive description of each variable can be found in Appendix A.
In order to justify the use of non-linear models, the linear form of three
models presented earlier was estimated and can be found in Table 4. It confirms
that a quadratic approach should be preferred. In the linear models, the debt-to-
GDP ratio loses all statistical significance. The only significant variables present in
the linearmodels regressed are the logarithm of the per capitaGDP, the population
growth rate, the government’s share of gross fixed capital formation , and the
long term interest rate, which exhibit a similar behavior to that shown in quadratic
models. No known literature suggests that other polynomials would provide a
better fit, therefore none were estimated.
Due to the endogeneity between the debt ratio and GDP growth, models
were also regressed using instrumental variables, which are displayed in Table
5. Two types of instruments were used: an average of the debt-to-GDP ratio of
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Table 5: Instrumental Variable Models
Annual Growth Rate Cumulative 5 Year
Overlapping Growth Rate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Instruments Avg. Lags(1-5) Avg. Lags(1-5) Avg.
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM (h.a.)
gov_debt .0905116 ∗∗ .1460957 ∗∗∗ 1.102967 ∗∗∗ .5325532 ∗∗∗ 1.102967 ∗∗∗
gov_debt2 -.0003768 ∗ -.0005279 ∗∗∗ -.0047922 ∗∗ -.0030316 ∗∗∗ -.0047922 ∗∗
gov_rev_ca -.0407788 -.0895344 -1.590251 ∗∗∗ -.372002 -1.590251 ∗∗
gov_cab -.0074936 .0093712 -.2687871 -1.083518 ∗∗∗ -.2687871
lgdp_cap -7.618454 ∗∗ -7.599396 -66.87787 ∗∗∗ -108.6424 ∗∗∗ -66.87787 ∗∗∗
pop_g -2.056797 ∗∗∗ -1.66419 ∗∗∗ -1.807385 -4.203129 ∗∗∗ -1.807385
saving_gov .4089242 ∗∗∗ .4770598 ∗∗∗ 1.807992 ∗∗∗ 2.190279 ∗∗∗ 1.807992 ∗∗∗
saving_priv .120874 ∗ .1067959 .0882808 .3259716 ∗ .0882808
openness 1.687958 .3598249 -.3752346 8.271588 ∗∗ -.3752346
LT_real_i -.1773575 ∗∗ -.195049 ∗∗∗ .5296739 .4258041 ∗ .5296739
Country Dummies Included Included Included Included . Included
Y ear Dummies Included Included – Included –
N 267 228 219 228 219
R2 − Adj .653908 .6344236 .7820432 .8637818 .7820432
rk LM 1.53e-11 7.70e-10 .0000712 7.70e-10 .0131274
Hansen j – .0407957 – .0000349 –
Threshold 120.1069 138.3708 115.08 102.6641 115.08
CI 95% [68.9; 171.3] [74.3; 197.1] [77.7; 152.5] [73.4; 131.9] [70.0; 160.2]
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marked according to significance level – *10%, **5%, ***1%. The dependent vari-
able is the annual real GDP per capita growth rate for the first two models, and a 5 year overlapping sum for the
latter three. A comprehensive description of each variable can be found in Appendix A. The instruments used were
the average value of debt of all other countries, for the models marked as Avg., and up to 5 lags of gov_debt and
gov_debt2 for the models marked Lags(1-5). Estimators used were 2SLS, two-step GMM, and two-step GMM with
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent statistics for the model marked GMM (h.a.).
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each other sampled country for that year; and the country’s own debt lagged up
to 5 periods for overlapping dependent variables. Non-overlapping models were
omitted due to low statistical significance, likely caused by the small number of
observations, and can be found in Appendix B, in Table B.5. Estimators were
computed through 2SLS, two-step GMM, and two-step GMM with heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation-consistent statistics.
Unlike the fixed effects models, here we see a significant increase in the
threshold values when compared to Checherita-Westphal & Rother (2012), with
an average threshold of 118%. The confidence intervals have also widened con-
siderably, a change that cannot be attributed to the clustering of standard errors,
which was not performed for these regressions. The bottom limit of the confidence
intervals fell to around 70%, which is a slightly more conservative value than that
presented in the original paper, but one that must be interpreted as part of a much
wider band.
4.2 Robustness Tests
Table 6 shows the effects of removing each country from the panel. Removing
countries with more extreme values of debt and/or growth causes large shifts in
the threshold and in the width of the confidence interval. As expected, removing
countries with more extreme debt-to-GDP values, like Greece and Luxembourg,
causes large shifts in the debt threshold. However, both cause the threshold to
increase, unlike the removal of a high-debt and high-growth country, such as Ire-
land.
We can clearly see the role of Ireland and Greece in the models where
they are absent. Greece brings the overall threshold down and serves as a warn-
ing to the problems of a high debt-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, if Greece is removed
from the sample, the 95% confidence interval widens to such an extent that real
13
world implications become hard to draw. On the other hand, Ireland is able to
maintain both a high debt level and high growth, significantly raising the threshold
by itself. Placing a restriction on any country other than these three does not have





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7 shows the fixed effects models presented earlier expanded to
include the variation of the debt-to-GDP ratio from one year to the next, in per-
centage. This variable is highly significant in the models where the dependent
variable is annual. The negative coefficient estimated for the debt-to-GDP ratio’s
growth rate follows expectations. These models suggest that an increase of 1% in
the growth of the debt-to-GDP ratio – that is, an acceleration of 1% – would, on av-
erage, cause a decrease of 0.045 percent points in GDP growth. When applied to
the most extreme example in our panel, Ireland’s 77.3% increase in debt-to-GDP
ratio in 2008, this effect could, by itself, explain a fall of about 3.5% in GPD.
Themagnitude of the effect is relatively large when compared to changes
in the ratio near the turning point, as can be seen in the simulation presented in
Table 8. For example, a change in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 100% to 120%
would be almost offset by a fall of 0.5% in the ratio’s growth rate, assuming the
debt ratio was stable before. This implies that, for a country with a debt-to-GDP
ratio reasonably close to the turning point, changes in the ratio’s growth rate are
estimated to be a more important determinant of GDP growth than a variation in
the ratio itself. From a public policy standpoint, this result suggests that the ratio’s
growth rate should be considered an important indicator of GDP per capita growth.
This variable loses much of its statistical significance in the 5 year overlapping
models, where the annual dynamics of debt are being lost along the 5 year period.
Moreover, the ebb and flow of the ratio’s variations are likely to blunt much of the
effect of one year’s change in debt over the five following years.
When countries are divided according to their position as either periph-
ery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) or core countries (Aus-
tria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), no
reliable debt threshold can be obtained for the core countries (see Table 9). The
turning point obtained when only periphery countries are considered is lower when
computed through a fixed effects model (79% down from around 90%), but higher
when obtained via an IV model (123% up from an average of 118%). It is not
16
Table 7: Fixed Effects Models With Debt-to-GDP Ratio Growth
Annual Growth Rate Cumulative 5 Year Cumulative 5 Year
Overlapping Growth Rate Non-Overlapping Growth Rate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
gov_debt_gr -.0460309 ∗∗∗ -.0451038 ∗∗∗ -.0398533 -.0092925 -.4251153 ∗∗∗ -.4806182 ∗∗∗
gov_debt .1233354 ∗∗∗ .1192487 ∗∗∗ .5812255 ∗∗∗ .6546546 ∗∗ .2578243 ∗∗ .4766291 ∗∗∗
gov_debt2 -.0006186 ∗∗∗ -.000621 ∗∗∗ -.0028433 ∗∗∗ -.0025881 ∗∗∗ -.0018827 ∗∗ -.0027208 ∗∗∗
gov_rev_ca -.00538 .0215496 -.8847254 -.8526612 .8235205 .6397749
gov_cab .157398 ∗∗ .1452122 ∗∗ -.1855201 -.7846983 ∗∗∗ .3177782 -.1153744
lgdp_cap -5.796957 -5.256643 -64.38237 ∗∗ -75.65301 ∗∗∗ 25.89347 ∗ 14.62003
pop_g -1.890508 ∗∗ -1.790112 ∗∗ -2.908369 -4.093713 ∗ -8.613093 ∗∗∗ -11.64401 ∗∗∗
gfcf_total .08575 – – – – –
gfcf_gov – -.1864465 -1.731435 – -1.372229 –
gfcf_priv – .0458388 .1342049 – -.4289342 –
saving_gov – – – 1.916585 ∗∗ – 1.87497 ∗∗∗
saving_priv – – – .568903 ∗ – .4641974 ∗∗
openness 1.573706 1.646186 8.356932 8.187485 -5.688223 -7.222996 ∗
LT_real_i -.0979079 -.1135632 .1012957 .2480514 -1.072219 ∗ -.5903108
N 267 267 219 219 60 60
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12
R2 − within .6757315 .675616 .8319213 .8629141 .9069938 .9347916
Threshold 99.7 96.0 102.2 126.5 68.5 87.6
CI 95% [69.0; 130.3] [69.2; 122.8] [63.5; 140.9] [77.1; 175.8] [49.9; 87.0] [67.4; 107.8]
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marked according to significance level – *10%, **5%, ***1%. The dependent variable is the annual
real GDP per capita growth rate for the first two models, a 5 year overlapping sum of the same variable for the middle models, and a
5 year non-overlapping sum for the final two.
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Table 8: Interaction Between the Debt-to-GDP Ratio and its Growth Rate
Debt Ratio Impact Debt Ratio Growth Impact GDP Growth
5.173 -0.5 0.2301 5.403
60 5.173 -1 0.4603 5.633
5.173 -3 1.3809 6.554
5.907 -0.5 0.2301 6.137
80 5.907 -1 0.4603 6.368
5.907 -3 1.3809 7.288
6.147 -0.5 0.2301 6.377
100 6.147 -1 0.4603 6.607
6.147 -3 1.3809 7.528
5.892 -0.5 0.2301 6.122
120 5.892 -1 0.4603 6.352
5.892 -3 1.3809 7.273
4.581 -0.5 0.2301 4.811
150 4.581 -1 0.4603 5.042
4.581 -3 1.3809 5.962
Notes: This simulation was calculated using the baseline annual growth rate fixed effects model
expanded with the growth rate of the Debt-to-GDP ratio (Table 7 Model 1). Debt Ratio presented
as a percentage of GDP. Impact refers to the effect of each variable on GDP growth. Values for
Debt Ratio Growth presented as a percentage of the Debt-to-GDP ratio.
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Table 9: FE and IV Models Divided in Periphery and Core Countries
Fixed Effects 2SLS IV 1-5 Lags
Periphery Core Periphery Core
gov_debt .141077 ∗∗ .0180168 .2440811 ∗∗∗ -.0505404
gov_debt2 -.0008883 ∗∗ -.0000509 -.0009919 ∗∗∗ .0000857
gov_rev_ca .3314599 .006875 -.2954842 -.3492951 ∗∗∗
gov_cab .1524185 .1909383 -.0193863 .4339063 ∗∗∗
lgdp_cap -12.93679 ∗∗ -16.82082 ∗∗ -6.488499 -28.43502 ∗∗∗
pop_g -2.163332 -.6155736 ∗ -1.896732 ∗∗∗ -.7732328 ∗
saving_gov – – .8818154 ∗∗∗ -.0440411
saving_priv – – -.0065938 -.061608
openness 13.12077 ∗∗ .649831 1.628682 -1.176155 ∗
LT_real_i -.0390448 -.0502908 .0409909 -.0435499
N 110 157 95 133
R2 − Adj .6075888 .7842052 .6466616 .8199139
rk LM – – .0016015 .0000455
Hansen j – – .7711385 .1190433
Debt Turning Point 79.4 – 123.0 –
CI 95% [43.8; 115.0] – [84.8; 161.3] –
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marked according to significance level – *10%, **5%, ***1%. The
dependent variable is the annual real GDP per capita growth rate for all models. Periphery countries were
defined as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, while all other sampled countries were considered
core.
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easy to discern a concrete cause for this ambiguous effect. The absence of a
clear debt threshold for the core European countries could be explained by an
extension of the distinction between developed and developing countries into a
continuous progression, rather than a strict dichotomy. Either way, further study
would be required to accurately comprehend this result.
Expansions including a dummy specific for the crisis years4, and the in-
troduction of the debt-service-to-GDP ratio5 were attempted, but did not expand
the explanatory power of the model. For the crisis variable this may be due to the
inclusion of yearly dummies that already capture the effects specific to that pe-
riod. The debt service effect may already be captured by the interaction between
the debt-to-GDP ratio and the interest rate. Possible further expansions could at-
tempt to estimate similar models using debt held by the public as an explanatory





While the sovereign debt crisis has passed, it has left some European countries
with large amounts of debt whose effects on growth still remains a point of con-
tention. In this work, 12 euro area countries were analyzed from 1993 to 2017
using a non-linear methodology . The time span showed an increase in the debt
thresholds – the ratio of debt-to-GDP past which an increase in debt has a neg-
ative effect on the GDP growth rate – when compared to the existing literature.
The thresholds obtained averaged 105% for fixed effects models, and 118% for
instrumental variables models, which are considerably high when compared to
similar literature. Therefore, some empirical evidence was obtained suggesting
that the increase in debt that came to be during the European sovereign debt cri-
sis moved the debt turning point thresholds, rather than adhered to them. This
may be a particular quirk of the panel observed, or may represent the effects of
a new underlying framework, such as the relatively newer European institutions,
that are not as prominent when longer periods are used.
The increase in the thresholds obtained was accompanied by a widening
of the confidence intervals associated with those values. Due to this, concrete
policy implications are now much harder to draw from these thresholds due to the
uncertainty surrounding the exact debt ratios to avoid. While the results obtained
support the Maastricht limit of 60% as safe, falling below the lower band of nearly
all the confidence intervals computed, little evidence was found that slightly higher
debt-to-GDP ratios (up to around 90 to 100%) cause growth to slow down. One
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less discussed point is that, in the context of this analysis, the turning point is, by
definition, the debt-to-GDP ratio that maximizes growth, which means that lower
ratios would also impact growth negatively in the same manner higher ratios do.
The growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio was found to have strong ex-
planatory power when the model was expanded to include it, and the dependent
variable was either annual or a 5 year non-overlapping window. The effect associ-
ated with an increase in debt growth is strongly nefarious for GDP growth. When
considering the estimates obtained for the annual models, a reasonably small
change in the debt-to-GDP ratio’s growth rate could offset considerable changes
in the ratio itself, which is a result with very strong policy implications. For one, the
high-debt legacy left by the sovereign debt crisis could have its effect mitigated by
reasonably small declines in debt growth. If further research confirms it, changes
in the ratio’s growth rate may prove a very interesting explanatory variable when
exploring the nexus between debt and growth.
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Table A.1: Data Description
Variable Description Unit
gdp_cap Gross domestic product at 2010 reference levels per head of population 103€
gdp_gr Growth rate of gdp_cap % of GDP/cap
gov_debt General government consolidated gross debt % of GDP
gov_debt2 Square of gov_debt –
gov_rev_ca Cyclically adjusted total revenue of general government % of GDP
gov_cab Cyclically adjusted net lending or net borrowing of general government % of GDP
lgdp_cap Logarithm of gdp_cap –
pop_g Growth rate of the population %
gfcf_total Gross fixed capital formation at current prices: total 106€
gfcf_gov Gross fixed capital formation at current prices: general government 106€
gfcf_priv Gross fixed capital formation at current prices: private sector 106€
saving_gov Gross saving: general government % of GDP
saving_priv Gross saving: private sector % of GDP
imports Imports of goods and services at 2010 prices 106€
exports Exports of goods and services at 2010 prices 106€
openness Sum of imports and exports, divided by GDP % of GDP
LT_real_i Real long-term interest rates %
gov_debt_gr Growth rate of gov_debt %
gov_bal Net lending or net borrowing: general government % of GDP
gov_primary_bal Net lending or net borrowing excluding interest: general government % of GDP
debt_service gov_primary_bal minus gov_bal % of GDP
debt_service_gr Growth rate of debt_service %
All data sourced from the European Commission’s AMECO database.
27
Appendix B
Test and Regression Outputs
B.1 Preliminary Tests
Table B.1: Unit Root Tests on GPD growth per capita: Levin-Lin-Chu
Adjusted t Panels Periods
-2.8135∗∗∗ 12 25
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table B.2: Unit Root Tests on GPD growth per capita: Im-Pesaran-Shin
Z-t-tilde-bar Panels Periods
-6.7377∗∗∗ 12 25
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Both tests firmly reject the hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots.
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Table B.3: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data
F Prob > F
78.415 0.0000
The hypothesis that there is no first order autocorrelation is firmly re-
jected.
Table B.4: Hausman Test for Fixed Effects and Random Effects
A p-value of 0.0000 firmly rejects the null hypothesis that a random ef-
fects model would be preferred.
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B.2 Regression Outputs
Table B.5: Instrumental Variables Models Excluded
Cumulative 5 Year
Non-Overlapping Growth Rate
Model 6 Model 7
Instruments Avg. Lags(1-5)
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS




lgdp_cap -91.71246 ∗∗ -57.19237 ∗∗
pop_g -3.787177 -5.337385 ∗∗
saving_gov -.0683741 2.0006
saving_priv 1.297034 .6030209 ∗
openness 8.500714 4.117417
LT_real_i -2.05108 .2361318
Country Dummies 14.93528 4.547974
Y ear Dummies 2.947673 -5.675796
N 48 48
R2 − Adj .7392056 .7597244
rk LM .0108408 .0034349
Hansen j – .0318115
Threshold 29.80611 127.9367
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marked according to significance level – *10%, **5%, ***1%.
The dependent variable is a 5 year non-overlapping sum of GDP growth rates. A comprehensive
description of each variable can be found in Appendix A.
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Table B.6: Fixed Effects Models with a Crisis Years Dummy
Annual Growth Rate Cumulative 5 Year
Overlapping Growth Rate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
gov_debt .1248963 ∗∗∗ .1151481 ∗∗∗ .5584808 ∗∗∗ .6507489 ∗∗
gov_debt2 -.0006184 ∗∗∗ -.0006092 ∗∗∗ -.0027455 ∗∗∗ -.0025658 ∗∗∗
gov_rev_ca -.0022968 .042245 -.8274248 -.8528041
gov_cab .2106793 ∗∗∗ .1852265 ∗∗∗ -.166643 -.7861764 ∗∗∗
lgdp_cap -5.460674 -4.549201 -64.20117 ∗∗ -75.90861 ∗∗∗
pop_g -1.969517 ∗∗ -1.79758 ∗ -2.938267 -4.14432 ∗
gfcf_total .0961038 – – –
gfcf_gov – -.3424112 -1.870243 –
gfcf_priv – .044994 .1011784 –
saving_gov – – – 1.936305 ∗∗
saving_priv – – – .5624901 ∗
openness 1.504972 1.548598 7.650795 8.038124
LT_real_i -.1476701 ∗∗∗ -.1690243 ∗∗∗ .0258798 .2353467 ∗
crisis -1.303728 -1.248661 2.249251 -.8233148
N 267 267 219 219
Clusters 12 12 12 12
R2 − within .659321 .6602253 .8309056 .8628612
Debt Turning Point 100.9907 94.51074 101.71 126.8105
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marked according to significance level – *10%, **5%, ***1%.
The dependent variable is the annual real GDP per capita growth rate for the first two models, and
a 5 year overlapping cumulative growth rate of the same variable for the latter two. The dummy
variable crisis takes the value 1 for the 2009-2017 period. The non-overlapping models were
omitted due to colinearity caused by the small number of observations.
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Table B.7: Fixed Effects Models with Debt Service
Annual Growth Rate Cumulative 5 Year Cumulative 5 Year
Overlapping Growth Rate Non-Overlapping Growth Rate
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
gov_debt .135408 ∗∗∗ .1319031 ∗∗∗ .5311398 ∗∗ .6392584 ∗∗ .2335496 .1752146
gov_debt2 -.0006772 ∗∗∗ -.0006925 ∗∗∗ -.0026282 ∗∗∗ -.0025288 ∗∗∗ -.0016771 -.0007146
gov_rev_ca -.0101562 .0251357 -1.114041 ∗∗ -.9704296 ∗ .4606506 -1.351514
gov_cab .2203553 ∗∗∗ .2058767 ∗∗∗ -.273572 -.8623728 ∗∗∗ .9156359 ∗∗ .0707412
lgdp_cap -6.931133 ∗ -6.02652 ∗ -79.00175 ∗∗ -84.15168 ∗∗∗ 31.59476 -24.48691
pop_g -2.087055 ∗∗ -1.910397 ∗ -3.695732 -4.052879 ∗ -5.293102 -10.37037 ∗∗
gfcf_total .1598689 – – – – –
gfcf_gov – -.2227944 -1.752025 – -2.372596 –
gfcf_priv – .0790352 .2968127 – -1.120113 –
saving_gov – – – 1.904621 ∗∗ – 2.266921 ∗∗
saving_priv – – – .6290277 ∗ – .8451641 ∗∗
openness .741029 .9110993 8.592683 7.414961 -.1614392 -2.084147
LT_real_i -.1213529 ∗∗ -.1445183 ∗∗ -.0114975 .1964783 -1.288429 -1.504321 ∗
debt_service .006518 .0053865 .0511418 .0440656 ∗ -.044274 .0190029
debt_service_gr -.0002961 ∗∗ -.0002632 ∗∗ .0003575 -.0001196 -.001112 ∗ -.0013279 ∗
N 267 267 219 219 60 60
Clusters 12 12 12 12 12 12
R2 − within .6705511 .6691216 .825922 .8599843 .8771679 .9107079
Debt Turning Point 99.97846 95.23025 101.0458 126.3942 69.62731 122.5967
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marked according to significance level – *10%, **5%, ***1%. The dependent variable is the annual real
GDP per capita growth rate for the first two models, a 5 year overlapping sum of the same variable for the middle models, and a 5 year
non-overlapping sum for the final two. A comprehensive description of each variable can be found in Appendix A.
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